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Abstract
The ability of markets to aggregate information through prices is examined in a dy-
namic environment with unawareness. We find that if all traders are able to minimally
update their awareness when they observe a price that is counterfactual to their private
information, they will eventually reach an agreement, thus generalising the result of
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982]. Moreover, if the traded security is separable,
then agreement is on the correct price and there is information aggregation, thus gen-
eralizing the result of Ostrovsky [2012] for non-strategic traders. We find that a trader
increases her awareness if and only if she is able to become aware of something that
other traders are already aware of and, under a mild condition, never becomes aware
of anything more. In other words, agreement is more the result of understanding each
other, rather than being unboundedly sophisticated.
JEL Classification Numbers: D80, D82, D83, D84, G14, G41.
Keywords: Agreement, Information Aggregation, Unawareness, Financial Mar-
kets, Information Markets, Prediction Markets.
1 Introduction
Do markets aggregate information through prices? This question has been examined
at least since Hayek [1945], as information aggregation is considered one of the most
desirable properties that a market can have. Intuitively, the mechanism is simple. A
highly priced security should prompt traders to sell, if they believe that its expected
value is low. But their sell orders reveal to the market part of their private information,
∗Some of the results in this paper also appear in an earlier form in Galanis [2011b]. I am grateful to Paulo
Barelli, Piero Gottardi, Larry G. Epstein, Martin Meier, Herakles Polemarchakis, Marzena Rostek, David
Rahman, Fernando Vega-Redondo, Marek Weretka, Xiaojian Zhao, seminar participants at the European
University Institute, the University of Southampton and the Summer in Birmingham workshop.
†Department of Economics, City, University of London, spyros.galanis@city.ac.uk.
‡Department of Economics, University of Southampton, UK, stelioskotronis@gmail.com.
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thus prompting everyone else to update and either sell or buy, revealing further infor-
mation. As long as there is enough time, price movements should eventually aggregate
all available information, as the price converges to the true value of the security.
Information aggregation has been studied in various settings, for example using the
Rational Expectations Equilibria in large decentralised markets. Moreover, Ostrovsky
[2012] showed that even if there are few and large strategic traders, markets aggregate
information, as long as securities are “separable”.
In recent years, the creation of numerous prediction markets aims exactly at leverag-
ing this property, in order to provide better predictions about future events, using the
wisdom of the crowd. Examples of firms that have used internal prediction markets are
Google, Microsoft, Ford, General Electric and HP (O’Leary [2011]). Iowa Electronic
Markets (IEM) is run by the University of Iowa and aims at predicting political events,
in many cases with considerable success. For example, Berg et al. [2008] estimates that
for the five presidential elections between 1988 and 2004, 74% of the time the IEM
outperformed the predictions of 964 polls, whereas for predictions 100 days in advance,
the IEM outperformed at every election.
The purpose of this paper is to examine whether information aggregation and
agreement is still possible in an environment with unawareness, where the informa-
tion structure is not common knowledge. The intuitive mechanism that was explained
above implicitly assumed that if trader i observes trader j selling the security, she
can correctly identify what this reveals about her private information. However, if i
is unaware of something that j is aware of, this might not be possible. For example,
suppose that trader i is unaware of the concept of interest rates, hence she cannot
understand that j has some information about whether they will go up or down. As a
result, she cannot interpret j’s sale order as a signal that the interest rates are about
to increase.1
If trader i cannot rationalise j’s actions, there are two possibilities. The first is
that she ignores the information revealed by j’s action, thinking she might be wrong
or irrational. Effectively, she starts behaving like a “noise trader”, ignoring aspects of
her environment. In such a case, we cannot expect to have agreement or information
aggregation.
The other possibility is that she tries hard to rationalise j’s action and, in the
process, she manages to increase her awareness. We assume that awareness updating is
minimal, so that she never becomes more aware than necessary in order to rationalise
j’s action. Our main result, Theorem 1, specifies that if traders are always able to
minimally update their awareness, then they will eventually agree on the price of the
security. This result is effectively a generalization of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
[1982], who showed that if two traders with common prior take turns in announcing
their posterior about an event, eventually they will agree. Moreover, if the security is
separable, then they will also agree on the correct price so that there is information
aggregation. Ostrovsky [2012] showed the same result in an environment without
unawareness, for the case of non-strategic traders.
How demanding is the assumption of minimal updating of awareness? Theorem
1The connection between low awareness and the ability to correctly reason about the information of others
was first explored in Galanis [2011a, 2013].
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1 also shows that a trader increases her awareness if and only if she becomes aware
of something that others are already aware of. Moreover, under a mild condition,
she never becomes aware of something that others are not aware of. In other words,
agreement and information aggregation does not depend on the ability of traders to
increase awareness unboundedly. Instead, they only need to be able to understand
each other, by becoming aware of the contingencies that rationalise the actions of
others. Such an assumption is significantly weaker than requiring that the information
structure is common knowledge, as in an environment with full awareness.
The trading mechanism that we use in this paper is the Market Scoring Rule (MSR),
also employed in prediction markets (McKelvey and Page [1990], Hanson [2003, 2007]).
It specifies that, in period 0, an uninformed market maker provides an initial an-
nouncement, which we interpret as the starting price of security X. In period 1, trader
1 revises the announcement, in period 2 trader 2 makes another announcement, and so
on. When all traders have stopped revising their announcement, the process ends and
the true value of the security is revealed. We assume that each trader is myopic, so
that she only cares about her current period payoff, when making an announcement.
Payoffs in each period are determined by a proper scoring rule (e.g. quadratic rule).
They are a function of the true value of the security, the current and the previous
announcements. Proper scoring rules ensure that the announcement which maximises
a trader’s current payoff is the expected value of the security, according to her beliefs.
Since each myopic trader announces the expected value of the security given her beliefs,
the setting is similar to that of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982], where agents
announce their posterior of an event. If we also assume that the security is separable,
then the agreed price is always the equal to the true value of the security, hence there
is information aggregation.
1.1 Related Literature
Starting with Fagin and Halpern [1988], there is a growing literature on unawareness.
Foundational models have been developed, among others, by Modica and Rustichini
[1994, 1999], Halpern [2001], Li [2009], Halpern and Reˆgo [2005, 2008], Heifetz et al.
[2006, 2008], Board and Chung [2007] and Galanis [2011a, 2013]. An overview of the
literature is provided in Schipper [2015], including several applications with unaware-
ness.
The ability of markets to aggregate information has been analysed at least since
Hayek [1945] and Grossman [1976]. Radner [1979] introduced the concept of Rational
Expectations Equilibrium (REE) and proved that generically prices aggregate infor-
mation. There is a large literature on REE and their convergence in dynamic settings
(e.g. Hellwig [1982], Nielsen [1984], McKelvey and Page [1986], Dubey et al. [1987],
Wolinsky [1990], Nielsen et al. [1990] and Golosov et al. [2014]).
The no-trade theorems stem from the static model Aumann [1976] and the two-
period model of Milgrom and Stokey [1982]. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [1982]
analyze a dynamic version of the no-trade theorem, whereas Cave [1983], Sebenius
and Geanakoplos [1983], Nielsen [1984] and Nielsen et al. [1990] generalise using other
aggregate statistics.
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DeMarzo and Skiadas [1998, 1999] study both fully and partially revealing REE,
providing several results on separable securities. Ostrovsky [2012] and Chen et al.
[2012] show that separable securities are both necessary and sufficient for informa-
tion aggregation, irrespective of whether traders are myopic or strategic. Galanis and
Kotronis [2018] extend these results to an environment with ambiguity. They use the
market scoring rule of McKelvey and Page [1990] and Hanson [2003, 2007], although
Ostrovsky [2012] proves the same result also in the framework of Kyle [1985]. Similar
approaches can be found in Chen et al. [2010] and Dimitrov and Sami [2008], where
more specific signal structures are examined.
Speculative trading behavior in environments with unawareness have been studied
mostly with static models (e.g. Galanis [2013, 2018], Heifetz et al. [2013a], Meier and
Schipper [2014]). Our setting is multi-period and we explicitly model how information
and awareness are updated, when a counterfactual announcement is made. Grant and
Quiggin [2013], Reˆgo and Halpern [2012], Heifetz et al. [2013b] and Halpern and Reˆgo
[2014] study dynamic games with differential awareness. Karni and Vierø [2013, 2017]
study how awareness is updated and the state space is enlarged in a decision theoretic
model.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first present an example in Section 2, in order to
illustrate our approach. Section 3 presents the model and the main result is provided
in Section 4. Proofs are contained in the Appendix.
2 An example
Before proceeding with the formal model, we first present a simple example of dynamic
trading with two traders.2 The information structure is depicted in Figure 1. There are
two traders and four state spaces, S0, S1, S2 and S3, where S3  S1, S2 and S1, S2  S0.
Each state space Si has three states, s
1
i , s
2
i and s
3
i . The projections are given by the
thin arrows, so that for k = 1, 2, 3, sk3 projects to s
k
1 and to s
k
2, whereas both project
to sk0.
The two traders share a common prior, which on each state space is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3).
Both traders are always aware of the bottom, or payoff relevant, state space S0. They
trade an Arrow-Debreu security X which pays 1 if s10 occurs and 0 if either s
2
0 or s
3
0
occur.
Trader 1’s information structure in period 0 specifies that, on the full state space
S3, she has a partition, so that P
1(s13) = P
1(s33) = {s13, s33} and P 1(s23) = {s23}. All
other state spaces specify that she is completely uninformed, so that P 1(sjk) = Sk,
where k = 0, 1, 2, j = 1, 2, 3. Her information structure is depicted in Figure 1 by the
discontinuous enclosures.
Trader 2’s information structure in period 0, depicted by the solid enclosures, spec-
ifies that P 2(s13) = {s11, s21} = P 2(s11) = P 2(s21), P 2(s23) = {s23}, P 2(s33) = {s22, s32} =
P 2(s22) = P
2(s32), P
2(s31) = P
2(s12) = P
2(sj0) = S0, where j = 1, 2, 3. The thick straight
arrows specify that at a state s ∈ S, trader 2’s awareness is at a lower state space
2A slightly different and static example is presented in Galanis [2018], where it is shown that an always
beneficial bet does not imply no common priors.
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Figure 1: Information structure in periods 0 and 1
S′ ≺ S, whereas the curved arrows show that S′ = S.
In words, the full state space S3 describes that trader 2 is fully aware and has
perfect information at s23, whereas at s
1
3 she is only aware of S1 and considers s
1
1 and
s21 to be possible. At state s
3
3, she is only aware of S2 and considers s
2
2 and s
3
2 to be
possible. On the other hand, the full state space describes that trader 1 is always fully
aware and knows whether s23 has occurred or not.
Although the two traders might have different awareness across states, what matters
for payoffs is only state space S0. For example, when trader 1 knows at s
2
3 that state
s23 occurred, she also knows that state s
2
0 occurred, hence the security X pays 0. Note
that if the two traders could speak with each other and reveal the information they
have about the payoff relevant state space S0, they would collectively always know
which state is true and therefore the true value of the security. Would the same occur
if, instead of pooling their information, they traded security X in a dynamic setting?
In other words, do prices aggregate information?
To study this question, consider the following trading procedure, which is called the
Market Scoring Rule (McKelvey and Page [1990], Hanson [2003, 2007]). Suppose that
the true state is s13. In period 0, the uninformed market maker posts an initial price
of 1/3. Since the market maker is uninformed, her announcement does not trigger any
updating of information or awareness. The information structure in period 1 is the
same as that of period 0.
In period 1, it is trader 1’s turn to make an announcement. Her payoff from period
1 is
−(y1 − x∗)2 + (y0 − x∗)2,
where y1 is her announcement, y0 = 1/3 is the previous announcement and x
∗ = 1
5
is the true value of the security. Since trader 1 does not know x∗, she chooses an
announcement that maximises the expected value of the expression, given her posterior
beliefs. We are effectively using the quadratic rule, so that the market maker’s “score”
by announcing y0 is −(y0 − x∗)2. Trader 1’s score from announcing y1 is −(y1 − x∗)2.
Her payoff is just the expected difference of these two scores.
The quadratic rule is a special case of a proper scoring rule. Its defining property
is that for every posterior belief, the expected value of the difference is maximised
by announcing the expected value of X. We explain these concepts in more detail in
Section 3.3.
In period 1 and at s13, trader 1’s posterior beliefs over the payoff relevant state
space S0 are (1/2, 1/2, 0). Because trader 1 is myopic, she only cares about her period
1 payoff, hence she announces the expected value of X, which is 1/2. This is equivalent
to buying the security from the market maker, who posted an initial price of 1/3. To see
that 1/2 is indeed the solution, note that the second part of the payoff does not depend
on y1, hence trader 1 chooses y1 ∈ [0, 1] that maximises −1/2(y1 − 1)2 − 1/2(y1 − 0)2.
Prices reveal information. Trader 2 understands that only states which describe
that trader 1’s announcement would be 1/2, are possible. In an environment with-
out unawareness, she would always consider such states to be possible, because the
information structure is common knowledge. In an environment with unawareness,
however, this is not the case, because low awareness might mean that trader 2 has a
wrong understanding about 1’s information structure. Indeed, at s13 trader 2 is aware
of S1 and considers s
1
1, s
2
1 to be possible. Both these states describe that trader 1 is
only aware of the payoff relevant state space S0 and has no information. Hence, she
should announce 1/3, instead of 1/2.
Hearing the counterfactual announcement of 1/2 is totally surprising for trader 2.
How should she react? One possibility is that she ignores any public information that
contradicts her own private information, either because she does not understand it, or
because she thinks it is wrong. In other words, she behaves like a noise trader who
ignores what others are doing. In such a case, we cannot expect that there can be
agreement or information aggregation.
The other possibility is that trader 2 tries hard to rationalise the counterfactual
announcement and, in the process, increases her awareness. In this example, the only
state space which is more expressive than S2 is S3. In the model, we assume that
traders are always able to update their awareness in a minimal way.
When trader 2 updates her awareness to S3 in period 2, she reinterprets the public
information revealed by announcement y1. In particular, she understands that an
announcement of 1/2 could arise if the state is either s13 or s
3
3. We denote by F
y
1 (S3) =
{s13, s33} the public information revealed by announcements up to period 1 and expressed
in state space S3. Note that F
y
1 (S1) = ∅, because S1 cannot explain an announcement
of 1/2. Hence, trader 2 needs to increase her awareness to S3.
Trader 2’s private information in period 2, P 22 (s
1
3), is the conjunction of two events.
The first is her period 0 private information, P 20 (s
1
3) = {s11, s21}, enlarged to her aware-
ness in period 2, S3, so that (P
2
0 (s
1
3))
S3 = {s13, s23}. The second is the public information
expressed by S3, F
y
1 (S3) = {s13, s33}. Hence, trader 2 knows that the true state is s13.
The new information structure in period 2 is depicted in Figure 2. State spaces
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S3
s13 s
3
3
s10 s
3
0
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s20
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Figure 2: Information structure in period 2
S1 and S2 cannot rationalise announcement y1, hence they are dropped. Although the
same is true for S0, we keep it for convenience, as the payoffs of X are defined there.
At s13, trader 2 knows that the true state is s
1
3, however trader 1 considers both s
1
3 and
s23 to be possible.
In period 2, trader 2’s posterior beliefs on the full state space are (1, 0, 0) and she
announces 1, which is the expected value of X. This announcement reveals to trader
1 that the true state is s13, hence in period 3 she also announces 1.
The two traders have reached an agreement on the price of the security. More
importantly, they agree on the correct price of the security, hence there is information
aggregation. Theorem 1 shows that this is always the case, as long as traders are
always able to minimally update their awareness, after listening to a counterfactual
announcement.
3 The Model
3.1 Preliminaries
The model is a reduced version of Galanis [2013], which is based on Heifetz et al. [2006].
The main difference from the latter model is that we do not impose the Projection
Preserve Knowledge property, so that lower awareness may imply a wrong view of the
information of others.3
3For a comparison with Heifetz et al. [2006] and Li [2009], see Galanis [2013] and its syntactic version
Galanis [2011a].
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We first present the static model and then add a time dimension. There are I
traders with |I| = n. Different levels of awareness are represented by disjoint state
spaces. Let S = {Sa}a∈A be the finite collection of all these state spaces. We assume
that S is a complete lattice and endow it with a partial order .4 If S  S′, we say
that S′ is (weakly) more expressive than S or, equivalently, that a trader whose state
space is S′ is more aware than a trader whose state space is S. By construction, there
is a top, or full state space S∗, and a bottom, or payoff relevant, state space S0. That
is, for all S ∈ S, S0  S  S∗.
A state s is an element of some state space S. Let Σ =
⋃
S∈S
S be the set of all states.
We assume that every state space S ∈ S has finitely many states. An event E is a
subset of some state space S ∈ S.
If S  S′, so that S′ is more expressive than S, we require that each state s′ ∈ S′
can be mapped to its “restricted” image in the less expressive S. Formally, we require
that there is a surjective projection rS
′
S : S
′ → S. Projections are required to commute:
if S  S′  S′′, then rS′′S = rS
′
S ◦ rS
′′
S′ .
Let E ⊆ S,E′ ⊆ S′ be two events and suppose S′′  S′  S. We denote the
projection of set E′ to the less expressive S by E′S =
⋃{rS′S (s′) ∈ S : s′ ∈ E′}. We
denote the enlargement of E′  S′′ to the more expressive S′′ by E′S′′ = ⋃{s′′ ∈ S′′ :
rS
′′
S′ (s
′′) ∈ E′}.
Trader i’s information structure is represented by a possibility correspondence P i :
Σ → 2Σ \ ∅. The interpretation is that at s ∈ S, i considers P i(s) to be possible. We
assume that P i has the following properties:
(0) Confinedness: If s ∈ S then P i(s) ⊆ S′ for some S′  S.
(1) Generalized Reflexivity: s ∈ (P i(s))↑ for every s ∈ Σ.
(2) Stationarity: s′ ∈ P i(s) implies P i(s′) = P i(s).
(3) Projections Preserve Ignorance: If s ∈ S and S′  S then (P i(s))↑ ⊆ (P i(ss′))↑.
(4) Projections Preserve Awareness: If s ∈ S, s ∈ P i(s) and S′  S then sS′ ∈
P i(sS′).
These properties are discussed extensively in Heifetz et al. [2006] and Galanis [2013].
Let Si(s) denote trader i’s state space at s ∈ Σ. In particular, Si : Σ→ S is such that
for any s ∈ Σ, Si(s) = S if P i(s) ⊆ S. If Si(s)  Sj(s) then we say that trader i is
more aware than trader j at s.
Because there are many state spaces, we define a generalized prior pi on the full
state space S∗ and we assume that the prior for a trader who is aware of a lower state
space S is just the marginal of pi on S. Formally, a generalized prior is a function
pi : 2Σ \ ∅ → [0, 1] such that the restriction of pi on S∗ is a probability distribution and,
for any nonempty event E ⊆ S, pi(E) = pi(ES∗).
A trader updates her beliefs using Bayes’ rule, given her information and awareness.
In particular, if her information is P i(s), she assigns probability pi(s
′)
pi(P i(s′)) to state s
′ if
s′ ∈ P i(s) and 0 otherwise.
4A complete lattice is a partially ordered set in which all subsets G ⊆ S have both a supremum (or join,
denoted
∨G ) and an infimum (or meet, denoted ∧G).
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Definition 1. A (static) unawareness structure is a tuple U = 〈S, {rSα
Sβ
}SβSα , {P i}i∈I , pi〉,
where the collection of state spaces S and each state space S ∈ S are finite.
3.2 Dynamic awareness
As trading is dynamic, we consider a dynamic unawareness structure {Ut}t≥0, consist-
ing of a sequence of static unawareness structures, Ut, one for each time t.
Definition 2. {Ut}t≥0 is a dynamic unawareness structure if, for all t ≥ 0, Ut =
〈St, {rSαtSβ}Sβt Sαt , {P
i
t }i∈I , pi〉 is a static unawareness structure with the following prop-
erties:
• Ut is a subset of Ut−1,
• If s ∈ St−1 ∩ St, then Sit(s)  Sit−1(s), for all i ∈ I.
The first condition specifies that each Ut is a subset of Ut−1, so that the collection
of state spaces St is a subset of St−1 and the partial order  and projections between
state spaces are preserved. The second condition specifies that each trader cannot be
less aware over time.
A dynamic unawareness structure does not describe how awareness and information
are updated over time. We explain updating in Section 3.5.
3.3 Trading environment
Traders share a common generalized prior pi. We assume that for each s∗ ∈ S∗,⋂
i∈I
P i(s∗)S0 ∈ S0 is a unique element of the payoff relevant state space S0, that ev-
eryone is always aware of. This means that if the traders could truthfully pool their
information about S0, they would always learn the true payoff relevant state.
The market mechanism is based on Ostrovsky [2012]. There are infinitely many
trading periods t = 0, 1, . . . Let X : S0 → R be the security that pays according to the
state in S0. Traders buy and sell this security over time.
At time t0, a state s
∗ ∈ S∗ is drawn using the generalized prior pi.5 The realised
payoff relevant state is the projection of s∗ to S0, s0 = {s∗}S0 . Trading starts in period
0, when the uninformed market maker posts the initial price y0 ∈ [y, y] of security X,
where y = min
s∈S0
X(s), y = max
s∈S0
X(s). At time t1, trader 1 makes an announcement
y1 ∈ [y, y], at t2 trader 2 makes an announcement y2 ∈ [y, y], and so on. At time
tn+1, trader 1 makes an announcement again. There are infinitely many rounds of
announcements. However, since the state space is finite and each trader changes her
announcement only if her information changes, after some period t each trader stops
changing her announcement. In principle, these final announcements can be different
among the traders.
When everyone stops updating their announcements, the true value of the security,
X(s∗S0) = x
∗, is revealed and the payoffs for all traders are calculated using a market
scoring rule (MSR), which is based on a proper scoring rule r.
5We write S∗ instead of S∗0 to ease on the notation, because the full state space is the same for all periods.
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A scoring rule is a function r(y, x∗) where y is an announcement and x∗ is a re-
alization of a random variable. It is proper if, for any random variable X and any
probability measure pi, the expectation of r is maximized at y = Epi(X). It is strictly
proper if y = Epi(X) is the unique maximizer. This means that a trader who only
cares about maximising the score r, should announce the expected value of X accord-
ing to her own beliefs. An example of a proper scoring rule is the quadratic rule,
r(y, x∗) = −(y − x∗)2, that we used in the example of Section 2.
The MSR leverages the “truth-telling” property of proper scoring rules in a market
setting. It specifies that if trader i makes announcement yk at time tk, the previous
trader announced yk−1 and the true value of the security is y∗, then trader i’s payoff
in that round is
−r(yk, x∗) + r(yk−1, x∗).
Note that if i repeats the previous announcement, so that yk = yk−1, then the payoff
is 0. However, it can also be negative or positive.
Throughout the paper we assume that each trader is not strategic but myopic,
so that she only cares about the current period’s payoff and maximizes the expected
value of −r(yk, x∗)+r(yk−1, x∗), given her posterior beliefs. Because r(y, x∗) is a proper
scoring rule, the announcement is the expected value of X.
We say that information is aggregated if the announcements always converge to the
true value of the security.
Definition 3. Information is aggregated under dynamic unawareness structure {Ut}t>0
if sequence yk converges in probability to X({s∗}S0), for all s∗ ∈ S∗.
The convergence is with respect to the probability distribution on S∗, that is implied
by the generalized prior pi. Since the state space is finite, information aggregation is
equivalent to requiring that for each s∗ ∈ S∗, there exists some k′, such that for all
k > k′, yk = X({s∗}S0).
Ostrovsky [2012] shows that in an environment without unawareness and expected
utility, separable securities always aggregate information. The most well-known exam-
ple is the Arrow-Debreu security, which pays 1 if a state occurs and 0 otherwise. We
adapt his definition of separability in the current setting.
Definition 4. Security X is non-separable under unawareness structure U if there
exist generalized prior pi′ and value v ∈ R such that:
(i) pi′(s∗) is positive on at least one state s∗ ∈ S∗ in which X({s∗}S0) 6= v,
(ii) For every trader i and every full state s∗ ∈ S∗ with pi′(s∗) > 0,
E′pi(X|P i(s∗)) ≡
∑
s′∈P i(s∗)
pi′(s′)X({s′}S0)∑
s′∈P i(s∗)
pi′(s′)
= v.
Otherwise, security X is separable.
A security X is non-separable if it is possible to find a generalized prior pi′ and an
unawareness structure U, such that for all full states in the support of pi′, all traders
make the same announcement v, so that there is agreement.6 Yet, X does not always
6Note that if there is agreement, then traders will no longer update their announcements.
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pay v, so there is no information aggregation. Note that pi′ may be different from the
generalized prior pi of U.
3.4 Public information
Announcement yk about the price of security X reveals some of the private information
of the trader who made it. In an environment without unawareness, this announcement
creates public information that everyone interprets in the same way, as there is only
one state space. With unawareness, however, each state space S expresses a possibly
different public information.
Consider a sequence of announcements y = {yt}t≥0, where y0 is the initial an-
nouncement of the uninformed market maker. Let F y0 (S) = S be the public informa-
tion revealed by y0, expressed in state space S. Since the market maker is uninformed,
her announcement does not reveal any information.
At time t1, let F
y
1 (S) = {s ∈ F y0 (S) : Epi(X|P 1t (s)) = y1} be the public information
revealed by trader 1’s announcement, expressed in state space S. It contains all states
in F y0 (S) which describe that 1’s conditional expectation of security X is equal to the
actual announcement y1. In general, F
y
1 (S) could be the empty set, if S is unable to
rationalise announcement y1, as we showed in Section 2 with state space S1.
Denote by i(t) the trader who makes an announcement at time t. At time t ≥ 1,
if F yt−1(S) 6= ∅, let F yt (S) = {s ∈ F yt−1(S) : Epi(X|P i(t)t (s)) = yt} be the public
information created by trader i(t)’s announcement, expressed in state space S. We
can interpret F yt (S) as the information of an outside observer, who has no initial
private information and her state space (and highest awareness) is S, after observing
all announcements up to time t.
3.5 Updating
Each trader knows the history of announcements up to t. By incorporating the public
information revealed by the announcements, she can update her own private informa-
tion. In an environment without unawareness, updating is simple. For each s ∈ S,
P it (s) = P
i
t−1(s)∩F yt−1(S). This is equivalent to requiring that P it (s) = P i0(s)∩F yt−1(S).
In other words, the private information of i at t is the conjunction of i’s private infor-
mation at time 0 and the public information at t− 1.
With unawareness, however, we also need to specify how awareness is updated. In
our model, a trader is not aware of what she is unaware of. However, she may realise
that she lacks awareness in order to understand the history of announcements. This
occurs if she hears a counterfactual announcement, so that there is no state that she
considers possible and can rationalise it, because P it (s) = P
i
t−1(s) ∩ F yt−1(S) = ∅.
When the announcements cannot be rationalised given the trader’s awareness, there
are two possibilities. The first is that the trader realises that she misses something,
however she cannot update her awareness. As she ignores any future announcements
or the information that it reveals, she behaves like a noise trader. In such a case, we
cannot expect that there will be agreement or information aggregation.7
7Note that, in general, it is also possible that a trader excludes the projection of the true state to her
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The second possibility is where each trader can update her awareness when she
hears a counterfactual announcement that she could not rationalise with her existing
awareness. We require that such updating is minimal.
Definition 5. Given a sequence of announcements y = {yt}, updating for a dynamic
unawareness structure {Ut}t≥0 is minimal if for all t ≥ 1, s ∈ St−1 ∩ St,
1. P it (s) = (P
i
0(s))
Sit(s)
⋂
F yt−1(S
i
t(s)),
2. If Sit(s)  Sit−1(s), then there does not exist S′ ∈ St with Sit−1(s)  S′ ≺ Sit(s),
such that (P i0(s))
S′ ⋂F yt−1(S′) 6= ∅.
The first condition decomposes the trader’s private information at t into her private
information at initial time 0 and the public information at t−1, after all announcements
up to yt−1. If there is no updated awareness from t−1 to t, so that Sit(s) = Sit−1(s), this
condition reduces to P it (s) = P
i
t−1(s)∩F yt−1(Sit(s)), just like the case of no unawareness.
With unawareness, the private information at 0 is enlarged to i’s state space at t, Sit(s),
and the public information is interpreted within the same state space.
The second condition specifies that updating of awareness is minimal. This means
that the trader gains new awareness only if her previous period awareness was not
enough to explain the t− 1 announcement, because (P i0(s))S
i
t−1(s)
⋂
F yt−1(S
i
t−1(s)) = ∅.
Moreover, it is not possible to explain the announcement with a state space S′ which
is less expressive than Sit(s) and more expressive than S
i
t−1(s).
4 Agreement and information aggregation
The updating process described in the previous section specifies that the traders are
always able to increase their awareness when they hear an announcement that contra-
dicts their information. The awareness update is minimal, in the sense that the new
state space is the least expressive that can rationalise the history of announcements up
to the current period. Moreover, each trader never excludes the projection of the true
state on her state space, so Generalized Reflexivity is always satisfied.
If one of these (strong) conditions are not met, then at least one trader may not
be able to incorporate the correct public information and will not change her private
information or her announcement. This implies that traders may not reach an agree-
ment on the price of the security, or they may agree on the wrong price, hence no
information aggregation.
Theorem 1 below shows that when awareness updating is minimal and (a restricted
view of the) truth is never excluded, traders eventually reach an agreement on the
price of the security. This is the generalisation of the result of Geanakoplos and Pole-
marchakis [1982], in an environment without unawareness. Moreover, if security X is
separable under the “last” unawareness structure, which is generated when agreement
state space, s∗S . This can happen because she might not have a correct understanding of the information
structure of other traders. We explicitly exclude such a case by requiring that each Ut is an unawareness
structure, satisfying Generalized Reflexivity. If we allowed for the violation of Generalized Reflexivity, then
information aggregation may not occur.
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has been reached, then traders agree on the price which is equal to the value of X at
the true state, hence there is also information aggregation. This is a generalization of
Ostrovsky [2012] for the non-strategic environment without unawareness. One differ-
ence with Ostrovsky [2012] is that the condition of separability is imposed on the last
information structure, not the the first. The reason is that separability is preserved
under Bayesian updating. However, when there is also awareness updating, this may
not be the case.
The last two results describe when and how traders update their awareness. The
first shows that a trader updates her awareness if and only if she becomes aware of
something that the trader who made the announcement is already aware of. This is
the only way of rationalizing the announcement. Effectively, a necessary condition for
agreement is not that traders are really sophisticated and can always increase their
awareness, but that they can work out what the others are aware of. Agreement is
therefore the result of understanding each other, rather than full awareness.
Whereas the previous result places a lower bound on the updating of awareness,
the last specifies an upper bound. In particular, if j makes an announcement at time
t−1 and i increases her awareness from t−1 to t, the join of their awareness from t−1
to t does not change. In other words, trader i can at most become aware of something
that j is already aware of. This implies that agreement does not require that the
collective awareness of the group of traders changes. For this result, we only need the
condition that if i’s state space at t− 1 is Sit−1(s∗) and therefore it can rationalise all
announcements up to t− 2, then the same is true for all more expressive state spaces.8
Theorem 1. Suppose that awareness updating is minimal. Then, for any full state
s∗ ∈ S∗,
• There exists a finite t0 such that yt = yt0 for all t ≥ t0,
• If security X is separable under Ut0, then there is information aggregation.
Suppose that trader j makes an announcement in period t− 1. Then,
• Trader i 6= j updates her awareness at t, so that Sit−1(s∗) ≺ Sit(s∗), if and only if
Sit−1(s
∗) ∧ Sjt−1(s∗) ≺ Sit(s∗) ∧ Sjt−1(s∗),
• Suppose S  Sit−1(s∗) implies F yt−1(S) 6= ∅. Then, Sit(s∗) ∨ Sjt (s∗) = Sit−1(s∗) ∨
Sjt−1(s
∗).
As we have already mentioned, minimal awareness updating and Generalized Re-
flexivity are strong conditions. If a trader cannot update her awareness when hearing a
counterfactual announcement, then she may keep repeating her current announcement,
therefore not achieving agreement. Moreover, if Generalized Reflexivity is violated,
then traders might agree on the wrong price of the security, hence there will be no
8As we show in the proof, we only need this property for a specific (more expressive) state space, which
is
(
(Sit(s
∗) ∧ Sjt−1(s∗)
)
∨ Sit−1(s∗). The first part in parenthesis is the meet of i’s awareness at t and j’s
awareness at t − 1. This is the new awareness that i needs in order to rationalise j’s last announcement.
This awareness is combined with Sit−1(s
∗), i’s initial awareness.
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information aggregation. On the other hand, we can think of the current environment
as imposing weaker conditions than the standard one which assumes full awareness for
everyone and common knowledge of the information structure. Moreover, traders only
need to become aware of something that others are already aware of and there is no
need for the group to collectively increase its awareness.
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Note that for all S and t, F yt+1(S) ⊆ F yt (S). Although for some
state space S and period t, we can have F yt (S) = ∅, by construction for the full state
space S∗ and any t we have that F yt (S∗) 6= ∅. Since the collection of all states Σ is
finite, there exists t such that F yt (S) = F
y
t′(S) for all S ∈ S and t′ ≥ t.
Consider a state space S and time t such that F yt′(S) 6= ∅ for all t′ ≥ t and S′ ≺ S
implies F yt (S
′) = ∅. Such S and t exist because of the finiteness of Σ, the fact that
F yt (S
∗) 6= ∅ for all t and the fact that S is a lattice. Confinedness and the fact that
there is no less expressive state space than S imply that for all s ∈ F yt (S) and i ∈ I,
P it (s) ⊆ F yt (S) ⊆ S. That is, F yt (S) is partitioned by each P it .
Note that each i announces the conditional expectation of X given her private
information at s∗ and the public information at each t′. Because the public information
does not update after t, i repeats the same announcement y′ for all t′ ≥ t. However,
since each state s ∈ F yt′(S), t′ ≥ t, is not excluded, it must be that i’s announcement
given each s ∈ F yt′(S) is also y′. We therefore have that Epi′ [X|P it′(s)] = y′ for all
s ∈ F yt′(S). Integrating over F yt′(S), we have that Epi′ [X] = y′, where pi′ is the Bayesian
update of the common generalized prior given the public information at each state
space. Using the same arguments, it cannot be that another trader announces y′′ 6= y′
at each s ∈ F yt′(S), because this would imply Epi′ [X] = y′′, a contradiction. Hence,
after t all traders agree on their announcement and yt = yt′ for all t
′ ≥ t.
For the second claim, note that we have established in the proof of the first claim
that for some t′, for all t ≥ t′, each trader i makes the same announcement y, where
Epi′ [X|P it (s∗1)] = y for all s∗1 ∈ F yt (S∗), and pi′ is the generalized prior which is the
Bayesian update of pi given F yt (S) for each S ∈ St.
Suppose that the true state is s∗1. If for all s∗ ∈ S∗ with pi′(s∗) > 0 we have
X(s∗S0) = v, there is information aggregation at s
∗
1. Suppose that for some s
∗ ∈ S∗
with pi′(s∗) > 0 we have X(s∗S0) 6= v = y. Since the security X is separable and
setting y = v, condition (ii) of the definition of non-separability specifies that for some
s∗1 ∈ F yt (S∗), which is the support of pi′ on S∗, we have Epi′ [X|P it (s∗1)] 6= v = y. But
this contradicts the result of the previous paragraph, that all states in F yt (S
∗) specify
that all traders announce y = v.
For the third claim, let j 6= i be the trader who makes the announcement at t− 1.
By definition, Sit−1(s∗) ∧ Sjt−1(s∗) ≺ Sit(s∗) ∧ Sjt−1(s∗) implies Sit−1(s∗) ≺ Sit(s∗) and i
updates her awareness at t.
Conversely, suppose that at t trader i updates her awareness, so that Sit−1(s∗) ≺
Sit(s
∗) ≡ S, but it is not the case that Sit−1(s∗)∧Sjt−1(s∗) ≺ Sit(s∗)∧Sjt−1(s∗). Note that
Sit−1(s∗)  Sit(s∗) implies Sit−1(s∗)∧Sjt−1(s∗)  Sit(s∗)∧Sjt−1(s∗). By the definition of a
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lattice, if A  B but not A ≺ B, then A = B. We therefore have Sit−1(s∗)∧Sjt−1(s∗) =
Sit(s
∗) ∧ Sjt−1(s∗) = S ∧ Sjt−1(s∗) ≡ S′.
We next show that P jt−1(s
∗
S) = P
j
t−1(s
∗
S′). Since S
′  S and from Projections
Preserve Ignorance, we have Sjt−1(s
∗
S)  Sjt−1(s∗S′). Also, Sjt−1(s∗)  Sjt−1(s∗S) and
S  Sjt−1(s∗S) imply S′ = Sjt−1(s∗) ∧ S  Sjt−1(s∗S) ∧ S = Sjt−1(s∗S). Moreover, S ∧
Sjt−1(s
∗) = S′ implies that Sjt−1(s
∗)  S′. Projections Preserve Awareness implies that
Sjt−1(s
∗
S′) = S
′. However, Sjt−1(s
∗
S′) = S
′  Sjt−1(s∗S), therefore Sjt−1(s∗S′) = S′ =
Sjt−1(s
∗
S). Stationarity and S
j
t−1(s
∗
S) = S
j
t−1(s
∗
S′) = S
′ imply P jt−1(s
∗
S) = P
j
t−1(s
∗
S′).
From Generalized Reflexivity, we have that s∗
Sit−1(s∗)
∈ P it−1(s∗) = P i0(s∗)S
i
t−1(s
∗) ∩
F yt−2(S
i
t−1(s∗)) and s∗Sit(s∗) ∈ P
i
t (s
∗) = P i0(s∗)S
i
t(s
∗) ∩ F yt−1(Sit(s∗)). Moreover, i updates
her awareness from t− 1 to t because (P i0(s∗))S
i
t−1(s
∗)⋂F yt−1(Sit−1(s∗)) = ∅.
Because S  Sit−1(s∗)  S′ we have Sjt−1(s∗S)  Sjt−1(s∗Sit−1(s∗))  S
j
t−1(s
∗
S′). Hence,
Sjt−1(s
∗
S) = S
j
t−1(s
∗
Sit−1(s∗)
) = Sjt−1(s
∗
S′) and P
j
t−1(s
∗
S) = P
j
t−1(s
∗
Sit−1(s∗)
) = P jt−1(s
∗
S′).
This implies that both s∗
Sit−1(s∗)
and s∗
Sit(s
∗) describe the same information and aware-
ness about j. Since s∗
Sit(s
∗) ∈ F
y
t−1(S
i
t(s
∗)), it means that s∗
Sit(s
∗) can rationalise an-
nouncement yt−1. But then this means that s∗Sit−1(s∗)
can also rationalise yt−1, so that
s∗
Sit−1(s∗)
∈ F yt−1(Sit−1(s∗)), contradicting that P i0(s∗)S
i
t−1(s
∗) ∩ F yt−1(Sit−1(s∗)) = ∅.
For the fourth claim, by construction j does not update her awareness at t, as she
is the one making the announcement at t− 1. If i also does not update her awareness,
then the result is true. Suppose now that at time t, trader i updates her awareness, so
that Sit−1(s∗) ≺ Sit(s∗) = S, but Sit−1(s∗) ∨ Sjt−1(s∗) ≺ Sit(s∗) ∨ Sjt (s∗). We will show
that there exists S′ such that Sit−1(s∗)  S′  S, s∗S′ rationalizes j’s announcement
and Sit−1(s∗)∨ Sjt−1(s∗) = S′ ∨ Sjt−1(s∗). These three conditions imply that i updating
her awareness to Sit(s
∗) is not minimal.
Define S′ ≡ (S ∧ Sjt−1(s∗)) ∨ Sit−1(s∗). Since S  (S ∧ Sjt−1(s∗)) and S  Sit−1(s∗),
we have S  S′. It is also straightforward that Sit−1(s∗)  S′. We prove a stronger
result because we only use that F yt−1(S
′) 6= ∅ and we do not need the same to be true
for all S′′  Sit−1(s∗).
From Lemma 6.1 in Davey and Priestley [1990] we have S′ = (S ∧ Sjt−1(s∗)) ∨
Sit−1(s∗)  (S ∨ Sit−1(s∗)) ∧ (Sjt−1(s∗) ∨ Sit−1(s∗)) = S ∧ (Sjt−1(s∗) ∨ Sit−1(s∗)) 
Sjt−1(s
∗) ∨ Sit−1(s∗). Hence, S′ ∨ Sjt−1(s∗)  Sit−1(s∗) ∨ Sjt−1(s∗). It is straight-
forward that S′ ∨ Sjt−1(s∗)  Sit−1(s∗) ∨ Sjt−1(s∗). These two relations imply that
S′ ∨ Sjt−1(s∗) = Sit−1(s∗) ∨ Sjt−1(s∗)
We next show that Sjt−1(s
∗
S) = S
j
t−1(s
∗
S′) and P
j
t−1(s
∗
S) = P
j
t−1(s
∗
S′). Since S
′  S
and from Projections Preserve Ignorance, Sjt−1(s
∗
S)  Sjt−1(s∗S′). Also, Sjt−1(s∗) 
Sjt−1(s
∗
S) implies S
j
t−1(s
∗) ∧ S  Sjt−1(s∗S) ∧ S = Sjt−1(s∗S) and S′ = (Sjt−1(s∗) ∧ S) ∨
Sit−1(s∗)  Sjt−1(s∗S) ∨ Sit−1(s∗)  Sjt−1(s∗S). Again by Projections Preserve Ignorance,
we have Sjt−1(s
∗
S′)  Sjt−1(s∗Sjt−1(s∗S)) = S
j
t−1(s
∗
S). The last equality holds from General-
ized Reflexivity and Stationarity. Finally, Stationarity and Sjt−1(s
∗
S) = S
j
t−1(s
∗
S′) imply
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P jt−1(s
∗
S) = P
j
t−1(s
∗
S′).
The last equality implies that both s∗S and s
∗
S′ describe the same information and
awareness about j. Since s∗S = s
∗
Sit(s
∗) ∈ F
y
t−1(S
i
t(s
∗)), it means that s∗
Sit(s
∗) can ra-
tionalise announcement yt−1. But then this means that s∗S′ can also rationalise yt−1,
so that s∗S′ ∈ F yt−1(S′). We know that F yt−1(Sit−1(s∗)) 6= ∅, as it rationalizes all an-
nouncement up to yt−2. Because Sit−1(s∗)  S′, we also have F yt−1(S′) 6= ∅, therefore
contradicting that P i0(s
∗)S′ ∩F yt−1(S′) = ∅ and that updating to Sit(s∗) = S is minimal.
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